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Cohen: Deed of Trust Mortgage: Foreclosure Problems Student Symposium -

DEED OF TRUST MORTGAGE: FORECLOSURE PROBLEMS
A deed of trust is a mortgage agreement which enables the trustee
to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure in order to enforce the mort-

gage.58

Since Texas follows the lien theory of mortgages, the mort-

gagor retains title to the real estate pledged as security. 586 The mort-

gagee holds neither title nor a possessory right to the mortgaged
property s but does retain a "security interest" which affords a right
588
to the proceeds realized from a foreclosure sale.

The question of who has title to real estate subject to a deed of trust

does not generally arise until after foreclosure. Much of the litigation
involving deeds of trust, therefore, focuses on the question of whether
a foreclosure sale was valid, clearly transferring title from the mort58 9
gagor to the purchaser.
The law of notice regarding trustee's sales must be strictly followed
in order to accomplish a valid foreclosure.5 90 In Crow v. Heath591 the
court distinguished two types of notice-notice of trustee's sale as op585. Johnson v. Snell, 504 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. 1973); McLane v. Paschal, 47 Tex.
365, 369 (1877); Phillips v. Campbell, 480 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lucky Homes, Inc. v. Tarrant Sav. Ass'n, 379
S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 390
S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 1965); Graham & Locke Inv., Inc. v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234, 242
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
586. See Warnecke v. Broad, 138 Tex. 631, 634, 161 S.W.2d 453, 454 (1942); Texas
Loan Agency v. Gray, 34 S.W. 650, 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref'd).
Under the title theory of mortgages, the mortgagee would have a right to possession
prior to default. Lightcap v. Bradley, 58 N.E. 221, 223 (Il. 1900).
587. See Warnecke v. Broad, 138 Tex. 631, 634, 161 S.W.2d 453, 454 (1942); Lucky
Homes, Inc. v. Tarrant Say. Ass'n, 379 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1964), rev'd on other grounds, 390 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 1965).
Under the lien theory of mortgages, title can be taken from the mortgagor only by
a foreclosure. Foster v. Millinger, 8 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1928), aff'd, 17 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted). The basis for
this reasoning is that the parties always intended a debtor-creditor relationship, rather
than that of a vendor-vendee. This intent is looked on as ab initio as long as there
is an underlying debt. Duffy, The Character of Morgages of Real Estate in Texas, 12
S. TEx. L.J. 129, 131 (1970).
588. Duffy, The Characterof Mortgages of Real Estate in Texas, 12 S. TEx. L.J.
129, 135 (1970).
589. E.g., Crow v. Heath, 516 S.W2d. 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974,
no writ); Calverley v. Gunstream, 497 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); French v. May, 484 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
590. See also Chamberlain v. Trammell, 131 S.W. 227, 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910,
writ dism'd); Roedenbeck Farms v. Brousard, 124 S.W.2d 929, 935 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont), writ ref'd per curiam, 133 Tex. 126, 127 S.W.2d 168 (1938), appeal dism'd
per curiam, 308 U.S. 514 (1939).
591. 516 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
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posed to notice of intention to accelerate an obligation to pay a debt
evidenced by a note.592 A valid notice of the sale must follow either

the statutory requirements 593 or the notice provisons of the deed of
trust itself.59 4 Under the statutory requirements personal notice to the

mortgagor is not required; 595 however, if the deed of trust provisions

require personal notice, they must be followed.5 9 6 Additionally, any

time the mortgagee has chosen to exercise the option of an acceleration
clause, the courts have required that the mortgagor be given "actual

notice" of the demand for payment and of the mortgagee's desire to
accelerate the entire balance of the debt. 9 7 The courts in Texas have

looked with disfavor on the exercise of an acceleration clause because
of the inequities which may result.5 8 It is for this reason that there
must be "actual notice" to the mortgagor which is "clear, positive, and
unequivocal" when the mortgagee exercises the option to accelerate
payment of the debt. 599 Thus, the rationale for notice requirements
is to protect the mortgagor for two reasons: first, to encourage as many
bidders as possible at the foreclosure sale in order to obtain an adequate price and avoid a later deficiency action, 60 0 and second, to pro592. Id. at 228; accord, Lockwood v. Lisby, 476 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
593. Tnx. REv. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (1966). But see Goode v. Davis, 135
S.W.2d 285, 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.) (article
3810 is for the benefit of the mortgagor and may be waived by him).
594. Roedenbeck Farms v. Brousard, 124 S.W.2d 929, 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), writ ref'd per curiam, 133 Tex. 126, 127 S.W.2d 168 (1938), appeal dism'd per
curiam, 308 U.S. 514 (1939).
595. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (1966). The statute requires merely public notice of the trustee's sale. Fischer v. Simon, 95 Tex. 234, 241, 66 S.W. 447, 449
(1902); Koehler v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 425 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1968, no writ); see Comment, Nonjudicial Foreclosure Under a Deed of Trust:
Some Problems of Notice, 49 TExAs L. REV. 1085, 1087-1091 (1971).
596. TEx. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (1966); see Smith v. Allbright, 279 S.W.
852, 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 5 S.W.2d 970 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted).
597. Covington v. Burke, 413 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Jernigan v. O'Brien, 303 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957,

no writ).
An "acceleration clause" generally empowers the mortgagee in the event of a default
by the mortgagor to advance the date of maturity of the mortgage debt or to declare
it be due. McCormick v. Dagget, 257 S.W. 358, 361 (Ark. 1924); see Covington v.
Burke, 413 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
598. Motor & Indus. Fin. Corp. v. Hughes, 157 Tex. 276, 289, 302 S.W.2d 386, 394

(1957); Crumley v. Ramsey, 93 S.W.2d 191, 192-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1936, writ

ref'd).
599.
(1957);
ref'd).
600.

See generally 39 Tx. JuR. 2d Mortgages and Trust Deeds §§ 77-81 (1962).
Motor & Indus. Fin. Corp. v. Hughes, 157 Tex. 276, 289, 302 S.W.2d 386, 394
Crumley v. Ramsey, 93 S.W.2d 191, 192-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1936, writ
Goode v. Davis, 135 S.W.2d 285, 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth, 1939, writ
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vide the mortgagor with a last chance to avoid the necessity of a sale. 601
The only notice which the mortgagor received in Crow was a copy
of the letter sent to his vendee who had assumed the mortgage. This
letter indicated merely the mortgagee's desire to foreclose on the property pledged as security, without any indication of the mortgagee's desire to accelerate payment of the note involved. The notice by letter
did not afford the mortgagor the opportunity to remedy the default of
his vendee or provide that failure to remedy the breach would accelerate
the note involved.6" 2 Thus the court found the sale did not meet the
requisite standards of notice for a valid trustee's sale.
The lack of "actual notice" would, in itself, have been adequate
grounds for setting aside the foreclosure sale, 60 but the judgment was
also based on the inadequacy of the purchase price paid at the trustee's
sale. 60 4 In Texas the mere inadequacy of price at a foreclosure sale
is not sufficient justification for the cancellation of a trustee's deed. 6 3
There must be "proof of inadequacy of price coupled with a circumstance tending to establish a wrongdoing" in order for a trustee's sale
to be set aside. 6 0 The "wrongdoing" in Crow was the lack of proper
07
notice.1
The finding of inadequate consideration is also important in determining the mortgagor's remedy. The supreme court has held that
when a trustee's sale is invalid but title has passed to a third person
or the property has been appropriated by the mortgagee, the mortgagor
is "entitled to have the reasonable market value of the property credited on the note. . .."608
dism'd jdgmt cor.); see Phipps v. Fuqua, 32 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1930, writ ref'd); Reisenberg v. Hankins, 258 S.W. 904, 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1924, writ dism'd).

601. See Reisenberg v. Hankins, 258 S.W. 904, 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1924,

writ dism'd).

602. Crow v. Heath, 516 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1974,

no writ).
603. Covington v. Burke, 413 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
604. Crow v. Heath, 516 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1974,
no writ).
605. Tarrant Say. Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. 1964).
606. Crow v. Heath, 516 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974,
no writ); accord, Biddle v. National Old Line Ins. Co., 513 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Jacobson v. National W. Life Ins. Co., 403 S.W.2d
528, 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, no writ).

607. Crow v. Heath, 516 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974,
no writ).
608. Tarrant Say. Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. 1965).
Applying this rule to Crow no deficiency existed on the $15,000 note since the trial
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The general rule regarding the trustee's conduct is that he must
strictly follow the instructions in the deed of trust provisions. 60 9 This
rule is imposed because the deed of trust is the sole source of the
trustee's power and because of the harshness resulting to the mortgagor
from a foreclosure sale. 610 In those situations in which the deed of
trust provisions are clearly violated by the trustee's conduct, the mortgagor may have the foreclosure sale declared a nullity.61 ' For ex-

ample, a trustee may appoint an attorney in fact to conduct the foreclosure,612 but an unauthorized third person may not conduct the

sale.61
Any foreclosure conducted prior to a mortgagor's default
would clearly violate the deed of trust provisions.6" 4
The case of French v. May6 5 illustrates an exception to the requirement that the trustee follow the instructions in the deed of trust. The
deed of trust in French required that the trustee conduct any necessary
foreclosure at a "public auctiorn to the highest bidder for cash." 61 6

court found the reasonable market value of the property sold to be $28,675.00. Crow
v. Heath, 516 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ). In
Crow the mortgagee appropriated the property to his own use.
If the sale was invalid, but the property is retained by the mortgagor the mortgagee
may by alternative pleading request a judicial foreclosure. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Howard, 85 S.W.2d 986, 988 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1935, writ ref'd). See generally 38 TEx. JUR. 2d Mortgages and Trust Deeds § 158 (1962).
609. Slaughter v. Qualls, 139 Tex. 340, 346, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (1942); Michael
v. Crawford, 108 Tex. 352, 354, 193 S.W. 1070 (1917).
The provisions in a deed of trust may also be applicable against mortgagors, Criswell
v. Southwestern Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 373 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1963, no writ) (tenant at will provision applicable against mortgagor when invoked by
purchaser at foreclosure through a forcible detainer action). The deed of trust may also
provide the mortgagee with the power to appoint a substitute trustee. When the deed
of trust requires that the appointment be filed in the county clerk's office, the substitute
trustee has no power until his appointment has been filed. Therefore, any sale before
the filing will be nullified. Faine v. Wilson, 192 S.W.2d 456, 459-60 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1946, no writ).
610. Smith v. Allbright, 279 S.W. 852, 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1925), aiI'd,
288 S.W. 178 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted). The legal presumption of regularity which prevails over judicial foreclosures does not prevail over trustee's sales. Id.
at 854.
611. Slaughter v. Qualls, 139 Tex. 340, '346, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (1942). When
a bona fide purchaser acquires land which has been sold through a void foreclosure,
the mortgagor may not regain title from the bona fide purchaser. The reason for this
rule is that the mortgagor, through the deed of trust, created the apparent power in the
trustee to convey the land. It would be inequitable to permit a former mortgagor to
regain land from those who have purchased in good faith on the basis of the "apparent"
power. Id. at 346, 162 S.W.2d at 675.
612. Natalia v. Witthaus, 134 Tex. 513, 525, 135 S.W.2d 969, 976 (1940).
613. Slaughter v. Quails, 139 Tex. 340, 346, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (1942).
614. Id. at 346, 162 S.W.2d at 675.
615. 484 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
616. Id. at 425.
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Since the trustee actually sold the land on credit, the mortgagor alleged
617
that the sale was void.
The civil appeals court upheld the validity of the foreclosure, relying
on the authority of Chase v. First National Bank. 618 In Chase the facts
were similar, and the supreme court upheld the sale on the rationale
that there was "no injury [to] the mortgagor, or those claiming under
him."6'19 This was also true in French because the purchase on credit
relieved the debtor of any deficiency claim. Other relevant considerations were the absence of fraud and any unreasonable action by the
trustee. 620
The French and Chase cases exemplify an exception to the general
rule that the trustee should strictly follow the deed of trust provisions,
and their holdings should therefore be applied only to fact situations
of an essentially identical nature. Their basic rationale, benefit to the
mortgagor as grounds for upholding the foreclosure, should not be
taken as a, talismanic rule upholding foreclosures even when the
trustee's instructions are not followed. A broad application of this rationale would cause many determinations of the validity of foreclosures
to turn merely on subjective fact questions.
An essential procedure for a mortgagor whose land has been sold
under a foreclosure and who desires to recover title is to bring a suit
before the applicable statute of limitations has run. Different periods
of limitation apply in different types of suits to overturn foreclosure:
when a foreclosure is void, the 10-year statute of limitations governing
actions for recovery of land applies;21 when a foreclosure is merely
voidable, however, suit must be brought within 4 years from the time
the cause of action accrued.62 2
The test of whether the trustee's deed is void or voidable depends
on the effect on title at the time it was executed and delivered. If
the deed is a mere nullity, it is void, but if title is passed by the deed,
subject to being set aside because of an improper sale, it is voidable.62
617. Id. at 425.
618. 20 S.W. 1027 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892, no writ).
619. Id. at 1029. See also First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sharp, 359 S.W.2d 902,
903 (Tex. 1962) (bidder allowed time to obtain cash while sale is being conducted).
620. French v. May, 484 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
621. TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5523a (1958); see Slaughter v. Quails, 139 Tex.
340, 345, 162 S.W.2d 671, 674 (1942).
622. TEx. REv.CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (1958); Slaughter v. Quails, 139 Tex. 340,
345, 162 S.W.2d 671, 674 (1942).
623. Slaughter v. Quails. 13 Tex. 340. 345, 162 S.W.2d 671. 674 (1942): accord.
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Calverley v. Gunstream6 2 4 was a suit to recover title to land which
had been foreclosed and, alternatively, for damages for wrongful foreclosure. Defendant Gunstream had conveyed land by warranty deed
in August, 1954 to plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Calverley. As consideration for the purchase the Calverleys executed a note to Gunstream
secured by a deed of trust. In June, 1958 the trustee foreclosed the
land and executed a deed to Gunstream. The trustee's deed contained
a recital that the mortgagor had defaulted on the note secured by the
deed of trust. The plaintiffs did not file suit to overturn the foreclosure
until March, 1972, thus encountering the dual problem of overcoming
the statute of limitations as well as the recitals in the trustee's deed. 2 '
The court of civil appeals affirmed the lower court's holding that article 5523a barred any relief prayed for based on the invalidity of the
trustee's sale. 626 The purpose of the limitation statute is to safeguard
the titles of vendees claiming under a trustee's deed against attacks
based on facts which could have been ascertained in a timely suit after
the recording of the trustee's deed.62 Both grounds of attack asserted
by the plaintiffs-lack of default and want of personal notice of the
foreclosure-were not apparent from "matters of record," meaning the
recitals in the trustee's deed. Therefore, since the plaintiffs claim was
based on evidence extrinsic to the recorded document, the statute of
limitations prevented recovery of the land.62 8
Addressing a question of first impression in Texas, the court in
Calverley held that article 5523a does not apply to a suit for damages
for wrongful foreclosure. 29 The court explained that in an action for
damages the validity of the trustee's deed and its effectiveness to pass
title are not questioned; thus, there is no question of title, and article
5523a is inapplicable. 0
The plaintiffs in Calverley were granted a remand for a determination of whether the foreclosure was wrongful on the ground that no
Slaughter v. Qualls, 139 Tex. 340, 346, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (1942) (void foreclosure;
no default by mortgagor); Cline v. Cline, 323 S.W.2d 276, 284 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (voidable foreclosure; inadequate price at trustee's sale
coupled with failure to give adequate notice of sale to mortgagor); Wilie v. Hays, 207
S.W. 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1918, no writ) (void foreclosure; failure to give
notice of trustee's sale).
624. 497 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ).
625. Id. at 112-13.
626. Id. at 114-15.
627. Id. at 114.
628. Id. at 114-15.
629. Id. at 116.
630. Id. at 116.
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default had occurred.6 3 1 This was allowed despite the recitals in the
trustee's deed that there had been a default on the note secured by
the deed of trust. This illustrates the possibility that deed recitals may
be rebutted by parol evidence in a trial where the validity of a foreclosure is in doubt. It is standard in Texas for a deed of trust to contain instructions regarding its recitals.63 2 A trustee's deed will generally recite the mortgagor's default, the request of the mortgagee to
conduct the sale, and instructions for posting of the written notices of
sale. 63 3 The recitals in the trustee's deed usually constitute prima facie
evidence that all prerequisites for a valid foreclosure have been followed.63 4 It is now established that the recitals in the trustee's deed
may be rebutted in suits which are not barred by the statute of limitations.6 33 Thus, if the plaintiffs in Calverley had timely filed their suit
to recover title, parol testimony to rebut the recitals in the trustee's
deed would have been admissible.
The inherent validity of a foreclosure pursuant to a deed of trust is
governed essentially by the trustee's actions. If the trustee's sale is
conducted in accordance with the deed of trust provisions and the statute regarding notice for a foreclosure, the foreclosure may be successfully defended. In those suits which are filed prior to the running of
the statute of limitations or which do not affect the title to land, the
recitals in a trustee's deed may be rebutted.
COLLATERAL PROCEEDINGS

Collateral proceedings which may prevent a valid nonjudicial foreclosure are those in which mortgaged property comes in to the custody
of a court. Property may not be effectively foreclosed if it has previously been subject to any of four other judicial proceedings: bankruptcy in federal courts, 36 pendency of receivership in the state
631.
632.
strictly
1925),

Id. at 116.
See R. STAYTON, TEXAs FORMS § 3684 (1960). These instructions must be
followed. See Smith v. Allbright, 279- S.W. 852, 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
rev'd on other grounds, 5 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted).

633. See R.

STAYTON, TEXAS FORMS

§ 3745 (1960).

634. See id § 3684. For case law sanctioning this interpretation of the recitals in
the trustee's deed see Adams v. Zellner, 107 Tex. 653, 654, 183 S.W. 1143, 1144 (1916);
Cline v. Cline, 323 S.W.2d 276, 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Faine v. Wilson, 192 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1946, no writ).
635. Slaughter v. Quals, 139 Tex. 340, 348, 162 S.W.2d 671, 676 (1942).
636. On the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, the property of a bankrupt mortgagor
will come into the custody of the bankruptcy court. Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610,

615 (1934).

This rule applies even if the property is not located within the jurisdic-
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court,63 7 injunctions against the trustee from exercising his power of
sale,638 or custody and control of state courts sitting in probate mat39

ters.0

The case of Hutchison v. Bristol Court Properties, Ltd.64 0 illustrates

the mortgagor's burden of proof to obtain a temporary injunction
against the exercise of the trustee's sale. In Hutchison a note holder
refused to advise the debtor of the amount past due. The court found
that such conduct, in itself, was sufficient to invoke its equity powers
to prevent acceleration and the trustee's sale. 641 To obtain a temporary injunction the relator must prove only a "probable right to a permanent injunction and probable injury if the temporary injunction is
not granted. ' 64 2 Therefore, the burden of proof required for a tempo-

rary injunction against the exercise of a trustee's sale is less onerous
than that required for a permanent injunction. This is significant because a mortgagor may take advantage of the time allowed by a temporary injunction to remedy a minor breach, preventing the harshness of
a nonjudicial foreclosure.
tional boundaries of the federal district court where the bankruptcy proceeding originated. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734, 737-38 (1930).
Most sales pursuant to a deed of trust are invalid if completed after the bankruptcy
proceeding. Compare Cohen v. Nixon & Wright, 236 F. 407 (S.D. Ga. 1916); In re
Hasie, 206 F. 789 (N.D. Tex. 1913) with In re Smith, 3 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Tex. 1924),
afI'd, 8 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1925); Bray v. Aikin, 60 Tex. 688 (1884); Saunders v.
Given, 79 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 599, (1934);
Nations v. First Real Estate & Inv. Co., 13 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1929,
no writ).
637. A trustee's sale of property placed in charge of a receiver is void. Hacker v.
Hacker, 4 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1928, no writ); accord, Cline
v. Cline, 323 S.W.2d 276, 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Scott
v. Crawford, 41 S.W. 697, 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, writ ref'd). The rationale is not
that the appointment of a receiver destroys prior liens; rather, their enforcement should
be through the court. Ellis v. Vernon Ice, Light & Water Co., 86 Tex. 109, 115-16,
23 S.W. 858, 862 (1893).
638. No title can be transferred at a trustee's sale which is conducted in violation
of an injunction. Lindley v. Easley, 59 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1932, no writ). See generally 39 TEx. JUR. 2d Mortgages and Trust Deeds § 142
(1962); Blood, Injunction Bonds: Equal Protection for the Indigent, 11 S.TEx. L.J. 16,
22-24 (1969); Pittman, ForeclosureProblems-A Review, 30 TEx. B.J. 949, 988 (1967).
639,. Pearce v. Stokes, 155 Tex. 564, 291 S.W.2d 309 (1956); Delley v. Unknown
Stockholders, 509 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); American
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Jones, 482 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally 39 Tax. JUR. 2d Mortgages and Trust Deeds §
140 (1962); Pittman, Foreclosure Problems-A Review, 30 TEX. B.J. 949, 988-95
(1967); Note, 11 Sw. L.J. 247 (1957).
640. 508 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
641. Id. at 488; accord, Hiller v. Prosper Tex., Inc., 437 S.W.2d 412, 414, 415 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, no writ).
642. Hutchison v. Bristol Court Properties, Ltd., 508 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
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In Riverdrive Mall, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Investors6M the trial
court had denied the mortagor's request for a temporary injunction restraining the trustee's sale. Since the notice of sale had been posted,
and it was apparent that, unless enjoined, a foreclosure would occur,
the mortgagor sought a temporary injunction from the court of civil appeals on the grounds that if the trustee had conducted the sale prior
to the final adjudication of the appeal, a civil appeals court ruling reversing the trial court would have then been meaningless. 6 "1 The
court granted the injunction in order to preserve the subject matter of
the appeal.6
The power conferred by a deed of trust is a power coupled with an
646
interest, and therefore continues after the death of the mortgagor.
The mortgagee should be careful, however, not to request a trustee's
sale when, due to the death of the mortgagor, the jurisdiction of the probate court has been invoked over the mortgaged property.
One of the most significant cases regarding foreclosure after the
death of the mortgagor is Pearce v. Stokes 47 in which the administrator
sought to cancel a trustee's sale 5 months after it had occurred and
21/2 years after the death of the mortgagor. Recognizing the benefits
of forcing mortgagees to collect their debts through procedures sanctioned by the Probate Code rather than through a trustee's sale interfering with the administration of the estate, 4 ' the supreme court held
that a mortgagee may not successfully request a trustee's sale within
4 years after the death of the mortgagor unless the administration has
been completed: any trustee's "sale made after the death of the mortgagor and within four years thereof will be cancelled if an administration is opened and. . . seeks cancellation . . 649
643. 515 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
644. Id. at 4.

645. Id. at 4. As a condition for granting the injunction, the court required the
mortgagor to post a bond of $40,000. Id. at 4. The court granted the injunction under
the authority of TEX. REV.Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1823 (1964).

646. Weiner v. Zweib, 105 Tex. 262, 267, 141 S.W. 771, 773 (1912); Slay v. Gose,

233 S.W. 348, 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1921, no writ).
647. 155 Tex. 564, 291 S.W.2d 309 (1956).

648. See id. at 568, 291 S.W.2d at 312.
77, 80, 306 (1956).

The court cited TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§

649. Pearce v. Stokes, 155 Tex. 564, 569, 291 S.W.2d 309, 312 (1956); accord,

Delley v. Unknown Stockholders, 509 S.W.2d 709, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974,

writ ref'd n.r.e.); American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Jones, 482 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The application to open the administration of an estate must be filed within 4 years

after the death of the mortgagor. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 74 (Supp. 1974).
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FEDERAL AND STATE TAX LIENS

Before a mortgagee requests the trustee to exercise his power of
sale, he should check to see if any federal or state tax liens exist against
the mortgagor's property.65 0 The Federal Tax Lien Act of 196651 re-

quires that notice of a trustee's sale be given to the federal government
if a federal tax lien has been filed and recorded for more than 30 days

before the trustee's sale. 652 If the requisite notice of the trustee's sale

is not given, the sale will not extinguish the federal tax lien or any cloud
which it may cause on title. 653 State tax liens include, in addition to
a general tax lien,654 numerous tax statutes which expressly provide for
a superior lien on all property of a delinquent taxpayer. 615
MATERIALMEN'S LIENS

A common lien which competes with deeds of trust is the material-

men's lien. 656 In Texas there are actually two materialmen's liens, one
constitutional6 57 and the other statutory. 656 The case of First National
Bank v. Whirlpool Corp.6 59 exemplifies the basic issues of validity for

a statutory materialmen's lien, as well as the priority of this lien which
650. The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 amends and repeals several provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, see Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125. For the general
state tax lien, see TEX. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 1.07 (1969). Such liens must be filed and
recorded. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(a), (f) (federal); TEx. TAx-GEN. ANN.
arts. 1.07A, 1.07B (1969).
651. See Pub. L. No. 89-719; 80 Stat. 1125.
652. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7425(b).
653. Id.
654. TEX. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 1.07 (1969).
655. E.g., TEx. TAx-GEN. ANN. arts. 8.09 (Cigar and Tobacco Products tax); 12.13
(Franchise tax); 14.20 (Inheritance tax); 18.03 (Cement Production tax); 21.04(2)
(Admissions tax 1969). When necessary, each particular chapter of the tax statutes
should be checked to determine if there is a specific tax lien on the property. See Miller v. Calvert, 418 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, no writ). The court held
that the specific lien provisions in chapters 2-23 were not repealed by the enactment
of the general lien provision found in article 1.07. Id. at 872.
656. Essentially, the materialmen's lien was created to give construction companies
and related industries a lien for securing payment of materials and services provided.
See Hayek v. Western Steel Co., 478 S.W.2d 786, 795 (Tex. 1972); University Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287, 296 (Tex. 1967).
657. TEx. CONSr. art. XVI, § 37. It is well settled that the lien created by the constitution is self-executing and exists independently of any statute. Hayek v. Western
Steel Co., 478 S.W.2d 786, 790 (Tex. 1972); Strang v. Pray, 89 Tex. 525, 528, 35 S.W.
1054, 1056 (1896). See generally Youngblood, Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in
Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 665, 687-89 (1972); Comment, The Constitutional Mechanic's Lien
in Texas, 11 S. TEX. L.J. 101 (1969).
658. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5452 (Supp. 1974).
659. 502 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 517
S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974).
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may arise by operations of law. Whirlpool Corporation had furnished
refrigerators, electric ranges, dishwashers and disposals to the defendant, Beckwood, Inc. When it became apparent that Beckwood was not
going to pay the remaining balance on the appliances furnished, Whirlpool perfected its statutory materialman's lien. Beckwood had also
executed a deed of trust to its co-defendant, First National Bank, to
secure payment of a note for $1,850,000. The record clearly indicated
that the deed of trust was filed and recorded prior to the filing of the
materialman's lien. Whirlpool brought suit in order to foreclose on its
materialman's lien.6 6 °
The threshold issue was whether the furnished appliances were
covered by the statutory materialman's lien. The statutory materialmen's lien is available where the materials provided have been incorporated into a structure with the intention that they will not be removed' 61 and therefore become a part of the realty. If the materials
retain the characteristics of chattels after installment, security for payment of the indebtedness is derived from Chapter 9 of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code. 662
Assuming the materials provided come within the nature
of property
6
6
3
covered by the materialmen's lien statute,
the claimant also has to
perfect his lien by fulfilling certain notice requirements.6 64 An affidavit claiming the lien should be filed in the county clerk's office within
120 days after the indebtedness accrues. Also, two copies of the affidavit need to be mailed to the owner. 6 5 "Accrual of indebtedness"
is defined as occurring on the 10th day of the month following the
original contractor's completion or abandonment of his work. 66 6
The supreme court found that plug-in refrigerators and ranges retained the characteristics of chattels after installation and, therefore,
were not within the purview of the materialmen's lien statute.66 7
"Merely plugging in an electrical cord is simply not the 'incorporation'
or 'consumption' envisioned in the [Hardeman] Act. Such items have
' 668
not lost their identity as chattels.
660. Id. at 187-91.
661. First Nat'l Bank v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex. 1974); see Me'Connel v. Frost, 45 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931, writ ref'd).
662. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.101-9.507 (1968).
663. TEx. REv. Ov. STAT. ANN. art. 5452 (Supp. 1974).
664. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Supp. 1974).
665. Id. § 1.
666. TEx. REV.COv. STAT. ANN. art. 5467, § 19 (Supp. 1974).
667. First Nat'l Bank v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex. 1974).
668. Id. at 266. The holding of the court was in agreement with the majority of
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Priority of Materialmen'sLiens
When a materialmen's lien is prior in time to other liens, it has the
superior status.66
There has been considerable litigation, however,

regarding the priority of a materialmen's lien when not prior in time
to the attachment of other liens.670 The situations involving material-

men's liens and other prior liens may be divided into two categories:
those involving removable improvements and those involving nonremovable improvements.
When the materials furnished by the lienholder may be removed

without "material injury" to the land or other improvements, the
materialmen's lien has priority.6 7'

This prevents the enhancement of

real estate mortgagees' security at the expense of those who have later
2
furnished labor and materials for improvements. 7
In Whirlpool the materialman's lien was given preference over a
deed of trust lien which was clearly filed and recorded prior to the
other jurisdictions which have made the same distinction between appliances which are
merely plugged-in and those which are so annexed to a structure as to be subject to a
materialman's lien. See Elliott v. Tallmadge, 297 P.2d 310 (Ore. 1956). See generally
Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 1103 (1958).
The court also decided that Whirlpool did not have a constitutional lien on the refrigerators and ranges. Relying on the precedent of Reeves v. York Eng'r & Supply Co.,
249 F. 513 (5th Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 584 (1919), and Huttig Sash & Door
Co. v. Stitt, 218 F. 1 (5th Cir. 1914), the court held that the constitutional lien on manufactured chattels is "available to [a] manufacturer only upon articles made especially
for a purchaser pursuant to a special order and in accordance with the purchaser's
plans." First Nat'l Bank v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262, 268 (Tex. 1974).
669. See University Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287, 293
(Tex. 1967); Hammann v. H.J. McMullen & Co., 122 Tex. 476, 482, 62 S.W.2d 59, 61
(1933); Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. McGee, 43 S.W. 1030, 1031 (Tex. Civ. App.
1898, no writ).
670. See generally Helm, Establishment and Priority of Liens for the Development
and Improvement of Real Estate, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 387 (1968); Woodward, The
Hardeman Act-Some Unanswered Questions, 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 1 (1974); Youngblood,
Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 665, 689-98 (1972); Comment, Procedures for Claiming and Priority of Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in
Texas, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 21 (1969); Comment, Priority of Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 872 (1962).
671. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5459 § 1 (Supp. 1974). Improvements have
been held severable and subject to the preference in: Freed v. Bozman, 304 S.W.2d 235,
240-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (a ticket booth, a speaker
stand, and a screen at a drive-in theatre); Wallace Gin Co. v. Burton-Lingo Co., 104
S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, no writ) (a frame building); Mogul
Prod. & Ref. Co. v. Southern Engine & Pump Co., 244 S.W. 212, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1922, no writ) (pumps from an oil refinery); R.B. Spencer & Co. v. Brown,
198 S.W. 1179, 1180 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1917, writ ref'd) (a rock house).
672. Woodward, The Hardeman Act-Some Unanswered Questions, 6 ST. MARY's
L.J. 1, 26 (1974).
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filing of the materialman's lien.61A
This holding resulted directly from
the finding that the disposals and dishwashers could have been removed without material injury to the building in which they were embodied.6 74
In situations where the materials cannot be removed without causing
material injury to the land or other improvements, resulting litigation
often involves competing claims for the funds received from a single
foreclosure on the entire property.6 75 Since the claim of the lienholder
in such a case is inferior to any other lien prior in time,6 76 the time
677
of inception of the materialmen's lien is critically important.

In Irving Lumber Co. v. Alitex Mortgage Co.,6 78 the improvement
consisted of the "shell" stage in building a house. It was obvious that
the shell could not have been removed and sold separately without
damaging the realty or other improvements. Irving Lumber Company
had orally contracted with Merit Homes to build the shells while Merit
was still negotiating to purchase the lots. Alltex Mortgage Company
acquired a deed of trust lien from Merit for both the purchase money
and the construction loans as well as subrogation rights to the vendor's
lien. Irving Lumber's oral agreement became effective prior to the
execution of the deed of trust by Merit, but Irving did not begin construction until afterwards. After Merit defaulted on the payment of
its note to Alltex, the deed of. trust was foreclosed. The land was purchased by Alltex at the trustee's sale for $27,000 and subsequently
6 79
sold to other purchasers.
The supreme court ruled in favor of Irving, employing the doctrine
that the inception of a materialmen's lien relates back to the formation
673. First Nat'l Bank v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262, 269 (Tex. 1974).
674. Id. at 269.
675. See Yeager Elec. & Plumbing Co. v. Gaines Bldg., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 921, 922
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ).
676. Improvements have been held non-severable in: Cameron County Lumber Co.
v. Al & Lloyd Parker, Inc., 122 Tex. 487, 490, 62 S.W.2d 63, 64 (1933) (a house):
Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 446 S.W.2d 64, 69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1969), ajf'd, 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971) (a shell home); McCallen v. Mogul Prod.
& Ref. Co., 257 S.W. 918, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1923, writ dism'd) (window
frames).
677. For the determination of "inception" see TEx. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 5459,
§ 2 (Supp. 1974). Before a lien may be claimed, it must be perfected through the procedure specified in Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Supp. 1974). Home Say.
Ass'n v. Southern Union Gas Co., 486 S.W.2d 386, 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
678. 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 212 (Feb 6, 1971) (opinion subsequently withdrawn).
679. Id. at 212-13.
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of the contract between the original contractor and the landowner. 80
The court decided in favor of Irving, viewing the inception of its materialman's lien as having occurred upon the formation of the oral contract with Merit. Since this happened prior to the execution of the
deed of trust with Alltex, the materialman's lien was declared supe8

rior. 6 1

Prior to Irving Lumber materialmen's liens could incept only in one
of three methods: recording of contracts;82 the combination of an unrecorded contract and visible material on the premises;" 8 or the mere
delivery of materials."8 4 The novelty of the Irving Lumber case was
that a lien would have its inception upon the mere formation of an oral
contract.68 5
Mortgagees viewed this decision as most unreasonable, feeling that
it would make it impossible for lenders to assure themselves of first
lien position prior to any oral contract which mortgagor-developers
could make with companies in the construction industry. 6 As a result
of this decision the legislature amended article 5459 to provide that
the "inception" of materialmen's liens shall occur upon the happening
of the earliest of three events: (1) the construction of improvements
or delivery of materials which are actually visible from the inspection
of the land; (2) the filing of any written contracts; or (3) the recording
68 7
by affidavit of any oral contracts.
From the viewpoint of mortgagees and title examiners the statute
is an improvement over the previous case law. There is now a definite
procedure for discovering a materialmen's lien on a potential borrower's land. Also, the holders of materialmen's liens have the further
advantage of the codification of the relation back theory. 688
680. Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths, 88 Tex. 575, 583-84, 33 S.W. 652, 662 (1895).
681. Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 212, 213 (Feb.
6, 1971).
682. Recording is authorized ,by TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Supp. 1974)
as well as TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6626 (1969).
683. Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths, 88 Tex. 574, 581-82, 313 S.W. 652, 661 (1895).
684. University Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287, 296
(Tex. 1967).
685. Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 212, 213 (Feb.
6, 1971).
686. See Youngblood, Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 665,
693 (1972).
687. TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 2 (Supp. 1974), amending Tex. Laws
1971, ch. 231, § 2, at 1082-83.
688. See Youngblood, Mechanics' and Materialmen'sLiens in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 665,
693-94 (1972); Note, 9 Hous. L. REv. 174, 177 (1971); Note, 50 TaxAs L. REV. 398,
401 (1971).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol7/iss1/9

14

Cohen: Deed of Trust Mortgage: Foreclosure Problems Student Symposium -

19751,

7 STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

The Second Irving Lumber Case
Prior to the amendment of article 5459, the supreme court granted
a rehearing in Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Morgage Co.65 9 and altered
its prior decision. There were essentially two holdings in the court's
opinion requiring reevaluation in light of the new statute. First, the
court believed that the "priority of a secured interest [could] not be
determined on the date of the 'inception' of an agreement between [a]
contractor and a prospective owner [of land].6 90 Therefore, by virtue
of the fact that Merit did not own the land when it orally contracted
with Irving for lumber, the court believed that the relation back theory
would not apply in determining the inception of Irving's lien.
Although the court cited cases in which liens had been "subsequently
perfected" even though at the time the contract was formulated the
purchaser had not owned the land, these cases were distinguished as
not applicable in determining the "inception" of an agreement for
priority purposes. 69 '
It would seem more equitable in this type of situation for the acquisition of title by the landowner to relate back and exist at the time of
the contract for the purchase of materials from the lien claimant.6 9
This is especially reasonable in light of the fact that "Alltex had seen
the plans . . . for [the work to be done by Irving] prior to the making
of its loan; otherwise, it would not have known whether a loan . . .
was justified. 69 3
Additionally, in light of the amendment to article 5459 the prohibition against inception of a materialmen's lien with a prospective landowner seems unnecessary. That provision was enacted to eliminate
the possibility of secret oral contracts being used to determine the inception of a materialmen's lien 94 and does not require a contract with
689. 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971).
690. Id. at 34 (court's emphasis).
691. Id. at 343, citing Enlow v. Brown, 357 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1962, no writ); Breckenridge City Club v. Hardin, 253 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1923, no writ). See also Sprowls v. Youngblood, 23 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1930), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Harveson v. Young-

blood, 38 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved); Schultze v. Alamo
Ice & Brewing Co., 21 S.W. 160, 162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ). See generally
Annot., 52 A.L.R. 693 (1928).
692. See Breckenridge City Club v. Hardin, 253 S.W. 873, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Fort Worth 1923, no writ).
693. Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Tex. 1971)
(McGee, J., dissenting).

694. See Tex. Laws 1971, ch. 231, § 2, at 1082-83, as amended, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5459, § 2 (Supp. 1974).
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an "owner." Since mortgageee lenders are thus protected, the only
effect of preventing "inception" with prospective landowners is to create an unnecessary obstacle to holders of materialmen's liens.
The court in Irving also refused to assign a priority to the deed of
trust lien given for the construction loan different from that given the
vendor's lien for the purchase money on the basis that both came into
being "by the same instrument and transaction at the moment when
the debtor-purchaser first acquire[d] his title to the land."'69
This
effectively elevated the deed of trust lien to the same level of priority
given to the vendor's lien. 69 6
A vendor's lien is generally recognized as being superior to a materialmen's lien since the vendor's lien is viewed as being "on the land"
at the time a materialmen's lienholder makes his contract.6 9 7 For example, the lien of a materialman who contracts with- a prospective
owner of land is not superior to a vendor's lien which arises when title
is transferred.195 The novelty of the Irving case was that it allowed
a deed of trust executed to secure a loan for construction expenses and
to purchase land to have the same "on the land" status as a vendor's
lien.69 9 This effectively cut off the holder of the materialmen's lien
from receiving any part of the proceeds from the foreclosure which was
conducted. In light of the amendment to article 5459, a materialmen's lienholder should be recognized as second in priority in situations
similar to that in Irving. Otherwise, the inception of a materialmen's
lien under the new statute may be effectively altered when a lender
loans money for purchasing land and construction expenses and takes
a single deed of trust to secure the aggregate debt.
695. Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex. 1971).

696. See Note, 9 Hous. L. REV. 174, 180 (1971). For an explanation of the remedies available for a debt secured by a vendor's lien see Norvell, The Vendor's Lien and

Reservation of the Paramount Legal Title-The Rights of Vendors, Vendees, and Subvendees, 44 TExAs L. REV. 22 (1965).
697. See Youngblood, Mechanics' and Materialmen'sLiens in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 665,

697 (1972).
698. Harveson v. Youngblood, 38 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding
approved).
699. See Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex.
1971).
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